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STATE V. DUDLEY:
DEFINING THE THEORY OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a recent South Carolina Court of Appeals decision, State v. Dudley,' the
State of South Carolina convicted defendant Dana Dudley, a resident of Georgia,
of trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. 2 Dudley appealed her
convictions based on two theories Dudley first argued that South Carolina did not
have jurisdiction to prosecute her because she never entered South Carolina and
none of the alleged criminal conduct took place within the borders of South
Carolina.' Second, Dudley argued that the trial judge erred in failing to grant her
motion for a directed verdict on the conspiracy charge because there was no
evidence of agreement or intent to violate South Carolina law.'
In deciding the case, the court of appeals faced an issue of first impression in
jurisdiction6 is actually a component of
South Carolina: "whether extraterritorial
subject matter jurisdiction or whether it is more properly consideredpart of
personaljurisdiction."7 A three-judge panel of the court of appeals first heard the
case and, in a divided opinion, upheld the conviction for trafficking in cocaine, but
reversed the circuit court's denial of Dudley's motion for a directed verdict on the
charge of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.' The full court of appeals voted to rehear
en banc, and on rehearing, "six judges9 voted to vacate both of Dudley's
convictions," effectively withdrawing the panel opinion.' ° The court found that

1. 354 S.C. 514, 581 S.E.2d 171 (Ct. App. 2003), petitionfor cert.filed, Adv. Sh.
No. 31 (Aug. 18, 2003) (No. 3641).

2.
3.
4.
5.

Id.
Id. at 520, 581 S.E.2d at 174.
Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 22-25, 35-39.
Dudley, 354 S.C. at 520, 581 S.E.2d at 174; see infra text accompanying note 43.

6. Courts sometimes refer to the concept of "extraterritorial jurisdiction" as "territorial jurisdiction." For purposes of this Note, the terms are synonymous.
7. Dudley, 354 S.C. at 521, 581 S.E.2d at 175 (emphasis added). The classification of extraterritorial jurisdiction as a component of subject matterjurisdiction allows the court to address the issue
despite Dudley's failure to argue it at trial or on appeal, whereas the classification of extraterritorial
jurisdiction as a component of personal jurisdiction precludes review of the issue because Dudley
waived her right to challenge personal jurisdiction by failing to preserve the issue. Id.
8. State v. Dudley, No. 3579, 2002 S.C. App. LEXIS 202, at *23 (Ct. App. Dec. 9,2002) (withdrawn and superseded on rehearing en banc by State v.Dudley, 354 S.C. 514,581 S.E.2d 171 (Ct. App.
2003)). Judge Anderson wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Stilwell concurred, and Judge

Connor dissented in a separate opinion filed on December 9, 2002. Id. at *23.
9. The South Carolina Code requires six votes on rehearing to reverse the judgment below. S.C.
CODE ANN § 14-8-90(b) (West 2002).
10. Dudley, 354 S.C. at 518, 581 S.E.2d at 173.
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South Carolina did not have extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute Dudley, and it
ultimately held that "[b]ecause extraterritorialjurisdiction is a component of subject
matter jurisdiction, it may be raised for the first time on appeal or sua sponte by an
appellate court."" Dudley is currently pending certiorari in the Supreme Court of
South Carolina. 2
Part II of this Note outlines the facts of Dudley and describes the opinions from
the case, including both the original three-judge panel's decision and the full court's
resolution. Part III presents an overview of the theory of criminal jurisdiction,
including subject matter, personal, and extraterritorial jurisdiction, and discusses
South Carolina's and other states' treatment of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Part IV
revisits Dudley, questioning whether the court of appeals correctly decided that
extraterritorial jurisdiction is a component of subject matter jurisdiction capable of
being raised by a party for the first time on appeal or sua sponte by the court. 3
Finally, Part V argues that the court of appeals erred in treating extraterritorial
jurisdiction as a component of subject matter jurisdiction. By posing the question
as whether extraterritorial jurisdiction is a component of either subject matter
jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, 4 the court overlooked the real possibility of
extraterritorial jurisdiction as an entirely separate concept. Ultimately, South
Carolina should treat extraterritorialjurisdiction as distinct from both subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction-not subsumed into either category.
The question then becomes whether South Carolina should consider a defect
in extraterritorial jurisdiction as similar to a defect in subject matter jurisdiction and
capable of being raised by a party for the first time on appeal or sua sponte by an
appellate court, or to be more like a defect in personal jurisdiction and, thus, capable
of being waived.' Arguably, the court should have treated any defects in
jurisdictional elements other than subject matter jurisdiction as effectively waived
unless raised in the trial court and properly preserved for appeal.' 6 However, a
strong argument exists that territorial jurisdiction, although not necessarily a
component ofsubject matterjurisdiction, is akin to subject matterjurisdiction in that

11. Id. at 537, 581 S.E.2d at 183. Note that by holding that extraterritorial jurisdiction is a component of subject matter jurisdiction, the court avoided an examination of the actual nature of
extraterritorial jurisdiction and simply concluded that it can be raised by a party for the first time on
appeal or sua sponte by an appellate court.
12. 354 S.C. 514,581 S.E.2d 171 (Ct. App. 2003),petitionforcert.filed,Adv. Sh. No. 31 (Aug.
18, 2003) (No. 3641).
13. Id. at 537, 581 S.E.2d at 183. This Note does not consider the law of conspiracy generally
or Dudley's second theory that the trial judge erred in failing to grant her motion for a directed verdict
on the conspiracy charge because there was no evidence of agreement or intent to violate South
Carolina law. See id. at 518, 581 S.E.2d at 173.
14. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
15. It is even unsettled whether this issue is one of constitutional law or common law. See infra
note 116.
16. See Gordon v. Commonwealth, 568 S.E.2d 452,454 (Va. Ct. App. 2002) (observing that "a
defendant's claim that the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction is generally waivable" except"where
the defendant claims that the evidence fail[s] to prove the crime occurred in the commonwealth").
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it is such a fundamental limitation on the court's authority that it is capable of being
raised by a party for the first time on appeal or sua sponte by an appellate court.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of South Carolina should hold that
extraterritorial jurisdiction is separate from both subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction and that a challenge to extraterritorial jurisdiction is capable
of being raised by a party for the first time on appeal or sua sponte by an appellate
court. Accordingly, a criminal case brought in South Carolina should satisfy all
three of these "jurisdictional" elements.
II. STATE V. DUDLEY

A. Facts
On September 9, 1997, admitted drug dealers Earl Hale and Donald Stokes
drove from Roanoke, Virginia to Atlanta, Georgia.' 7 Hale and Stokes, both residents
of Roanoke, decided to go to Atlanta for a "dope run" after having some "dry
spells" in Roanoke. 8 Earlier in September, Stokes had spoken with his friend Dana
9
Dudley, a resident of Atlanta, to tell her he was planning to come to Atlanta.'
When the two men arrived in Atlanta, they visited a nightclub and later returned to
their hotel.2" The next morning, Stokes called Dudley and asked her if she could get
them cocaine; Dudley took $5,000"2 from the men and returned with cocaine within

thirty to forty-five minutes.22 Hale and Stokes planned to sell the cocaine in
Roanoke but were arrested in Anderson County, South Carolina as they returned to
Virginia. 3
Deputy Matthew Durham from the Anderson County Sheriffs Department
85 after noticing the vehicle
stopped Hale and Stokes' vehicle on Interstate
"weaving and making an improper lane change."24 Hale, the driver, told the deputy
"he was returning from a party in Atlanta," while Stokes, the passenger, told the
deputy they were "returning from afuneralin Atlanta."25 After giving the driver a
26
warning, Deputy Durham asked Hale if he could search the vehicle. Hale
consented, and Durham's partner, Deputy James Littleton, spoke with Hale and
Stokes while Durham searched the vehicle.27 Durham found a Ziploc bag containing

17. Dudley, 354 S.C. at 519, 581 S.E.2d at 173-74.
18. Id. at 519, 581 S.E2d at 173.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 519, 581 S.E.2d at 174.
21. State v. Dudley, No. 3579,2002 S.C. App. LEXIS 202, at *3 (Ct. App. Dec. 9,2002) vacated
by Dudley, 354 S.C. 574.
22. Dudley, 354 S.C. at 519, 581 S.E.2d at 174.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Dudley, 2002 S.C. App. LEXIS 202, at *2 (emphasis added).

26. Id.
27. Id.
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cocaine in the trunk of the car.2" Stokes attempted to flee while Littleton tried to
arrest Hale.29 Hale broke free in an effort to seize the cocaine and dispose of it while
Durham pursued Stokes.3 ° The deputies ultimately apprehended both men.3
Hale and Stokes identified Dudley as the supplier of the cocaine found in the
vehicle.32 The two men agreed to help the Drug Enforcement Agency prosecute
narcotics cases in South Carolina and Virginia as a part of a plea bargain.33 As a
result, agents monitored and recorded telephone conversations between Stokes and
Dudley in which Stokes attempted to set up a drug exchange with Dudley in South
Carolina.34 "Dudley refused to meet Stokes in South Carolina, but agreed to meet
him in Atlanta" on September 15, 1997.35 The set-up transaction was not successful;
however, officers arrested Dudley for the previous transaction for which Deputies
Durham and Littleton had arrested Hale and Stokes in Anderson County, South
Carolina.36
An Anderson County grand jury indicted Dudley for trafficking in cocaine and
for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. 31 "A jury convicted Dudley of both charges,"
and the circuit court judge sentenced her to concurrent terms of twenty-five years
imprisonment and fined her $6,000 for each charge. 3' Dudley appealed to the South
Carolina Court of Appeals, alleging "that South Carolina lacked jurisdiction to
prosecute her.., and [that] the Circuit Court erred in failing to grant her motion for
a directed verdict on the conspiracy charge."39
B. Opinionsfrom State v. Dudley
1. OriginalPanel
The original court of appeals panel considered several jurisdictional concepts

28. Id.
29. Dudley, 354 S.C. at 519, 581 S.E.2d at 174.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 519, 581 S.E.2d at 174.
35. State v. Dudley, 354 S.C. 514, 519-20, 581 S.E.2d 171, 174 (Ct. App. 2003),petitionfor
cert.filed, Adv. Sh.No. 31 (Aug. 18, 2003) (No. 3641).
36. Id. at 520, 581 S.E.2d at 174.
37. Id. "The indictment for trafficking in cocaine provided the following: 'That Dana Dudley,
AKA Dana Wilson did in Anderson County, South Carolina on or about September 10, 1997 traffic in
cocaine by aiding and abetting the bringing into this State of South Carolina 200 or more grams of
cocaine."' Id. "The indictment charging Dudley with conspiracy to traffic in cocaine read as follows:
'That Dana Dudley, AKA Dana Wilson did in Anderson County, South Carolina on or about September
10, 1997 to September 15, 1997 conspire with another to knowingly traffic in excess of 200 grams of
cocaine."' Id. at 520 n.l, 581 S.E.2d at 174 n.l.
38. Id. at 520, 581 S.E.2d at 174.
39. State v. Dudley, No. 3579, 2002 S.C. App. LEXIS 202, at *1 (Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2002).
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including subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and extraterritorial
jurisdiction.40 Both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion found that a
valid indictment vested the circuit court with subject matter jurisdiction, and
"Dudley consented to the circuit court's exercise of personal jurisdiction because
she appeared at trial, defended her case, and failed to raise any objection."'"
a. Majority Opinion

The majority disagreed with Dudley's contention that the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction to prosecute.42 Writing for the majority, Judge Anderson outlined three
concepts of jurisdiction: (1) subject matter jurisdiction; (2) personal jurisdiction;

43
and (3) the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by South Carolina. Judge

Anderson also cited the relevant section of the South Carolina Code under which
the State convicted Dudley for conspiracy to traffic and for trafficking in cocaine."
Since "both indictments apprized Dudley of the charges against her" and "contained

the necessary elements of the offenses charged," the indictments conferred subject

45
matter jurisdiction on the circuit court. Additionally, the court held that Dudley
waived any objection to personal jurisdiction because she appeared at trial.' Lastly,

40. Id. at *4-16.
41. Dudley, 354 S.C. at 520, 581 S.E.2d at 174.
42. Dudley, 2002 S.C. App. LEXIS 202, at *4.
43. See id.Note that Judge Anderson's opinion reappears, with some expansion, as the en banc
court's dissenting opinion, in which Judge Goolsby concurred. Dudley, 354 S.C. at 538, 581 S.E.2d
at 184 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
44. Dudley, 2002 S.C. App. LEXIS 202, at *8, *9.The South Carolina Code provides in relevant
part as follows:
Any person who knowingly sells, manufactures, cultivates, delivers,
purchases, or brings into this State, or who provides financial assistance or
otherwise aids, abets, attempts, or conspires to sell, manufacture, cultivate,
deliver, purchase, or bring into this State, or who is knowingly in actual or
constructive possession or who knowingly attempts to become in actual or
constructive possession of:
ten grams or more of cocaine or any mixtures containing cocaine, as
provided in Section 44-53-210(b)(4), is guilty of a felony which is known as
"trafficking in cocaine" and, upon conviction, must be punished as follows if the
quantity involved is:
two hundred grams or more, but less than four hundred grams, a mandatory
term of imprisonment of twenty-five years, no part of which may be suspended
nor probation granted, and a fine of one hundred thousand dollars ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(e) (West 2002) (emphasis added), quoted in Dudley, 2002 S.C. App.
LEXIS 202, at *8-9. Dudley also faced charges of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine under this section.
Dudley, 2002 S.C. App. LEXIS 202, at *9.
45. Dudley, 2002 S.C. App. LEXIS 202, at *9-10; see infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
46. Dudley, 2002 S.C. App. LEXIS 202, at *11. (Connor, J., dissenting); see infra notes 59-60
and accompanying text.
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the majority found that South Carolina could exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in
this case because "Dudley demonstrated specific intent to act and the intent that the
harm occur in South Carolina. 47
b.

DissentingOpinion

In her dissenting opinion, Judge Connor agreed with the majority that the
circuit court "was vested with subject matter jurisdiction based on a valid
'
indictment" and "that the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over Dudley."48
However, Judge Connor "disagree[d] with the majority's holding that South
Carolina could exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts committed by Dudley
'
outside of this State."49
Since Judge Connor did not find "evidence that Dudley
intended either crime to take effect in South Carolina," she concluded South
Carolina could not exercise jurisdiction.5"
2. RehearingEn Banc
The full court of appeals voted to rehear the case en banc, 5" and on rehearing,
the court concluded that extraterritorial jurisdiction is a component of subject matter
jurisdiction that can "be raised [by a party] for the first time on appeal or sua sponte
by an appellate court."52 The court vacated both of Dudley's convictions, holding
that South Carolina could not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.53
a. Majority Opinion
Judge Connor, writing for the majority,54 noted that "[a]lthough neither Dudley
nor the State specifically raised or argued extraterritorial jurisdiction, the original
panel implicitly recognized that extraterritorial jurisdiction is a theory under the

47. Dudley, 2002 S.C. App. LEXIS 202, at *16. Contra note 65 and accompanying text
(discussing that the court of appeals in its rehearing held that South Carolina could not exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over Dudley).
48. Dudley, 2002 S.C. App. LEXIS 202, at *23 (Connor, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at *23-24.
50. State v. Dudley, No. 3579, 2002 S.C. App. LEXIS 202, at *24 (Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2002)

(Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

51. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
52. State v. Dudley, 354 S.C. 514, 537, 581 S.E.2d 171, 183 (Ct. App. 2003), petitionforcert.
filed, Adv. Sh.No. 31 (Aug. 18, 2003) (No. 3641).

53. Id.
54. After rehearing on March 19, 2003, Chief Judge Heam and Judges Cureton, Huff, Howard,
and Shuler concurred with Judge Connor's majority opinion. Id. at 538, 581 S.E.2d at 183. Judges
Anderson and Goolsby dissented, and Judge Stilwell concurred in part and dissented in part in a
separate opinion. Id. at 538, 581 S.E.2d at 184.
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general concept of subject matter jurisdiction."" To analyze the nature of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the majority focused on the general concept of
jurisdiction and attempted to "distinguish between the component parts of subject
6
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction."
The majority stated:
Jurisdiction is of two distinct kinds: (1) Jurisdiction of the
subject or subject matter, and (2) jurisdiction of the person. In
determining questions relating to each, different rules apply.
Jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be waived by any act or
admission of the parties; but a party may confer jurisdiction over
his person by consent, or may waive the right to raise the
question. 7
The majority noted that South Carolina has defined subject matter jurisdiction
as "the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which
8
the proceedings in question belong."" The majority also noted that for criminal
offenses, a court has subject matter jurisdiction if"(1) there has been an indictment
that sufficiently states the offense; (2) there has been a waiver of indictment; or (3)
9
the charge is a lesser-included offense of the crime charged in the indictment."
The majority's conclusion was as follows:

55. Id. at 521, 581 S.E.2d at 175. Footnote 2 contained the following:
Other than a reference in her closing argument, Dudley never raised any
jurisdictional challenge to the circuit court. On appeal, Dudley only challenged
the lack of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the charge of trafficking in
cocaine. In contrast, the State argued there was no jurisdictional issue before this
Court. The State characterized Dudley's appeal as a question of personal
jurisdiction, which Dudley waived by failing to raise this issue at trial.
Id. n.2.
56. State v. Dudley, 354 S.C. 514, 537, 581 S.E.2d 171, 183 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003),petitionfor
cert.filed, Adv. Sh.No. 31 (Aug. 18, 2003) (No. 3641).
57. Id. at 522,581 S.E.2d at 174 (quoting State v. Douglas, 245 S.C. 83,87, 138 S.E.2d 845,847
(1964)).
58. State v. Dudley, 354 S.C. 514, 522,581 S.E.2d 171,175 (Ct. App. 2003), (quoting Pierce v.
State, 338 S.C. 139, 150, 526 S.E.2d 222, 227 (2000),petitionfor cert.filed, Adv. Sh.No. 31 (Aug.

18, 2003) (No. 3641)).
59. Id. (citing Carter v. State, 329 S.C. 355, 362,495 S.E.2d 773,777 (1998); see also S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-19-20 (West 2003):

Every indictment shall be deemed and judged sufficient and good in law
which, in addition to allegations as to time and place, as required by law, charges
the crime substantially in the language of the common law or of the statute
prohibiting the crime or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be
easily understood and, if the offense be a statutory offense, that the offense be
alleged to be contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.
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South Carolina was vested with personal jurisdiction because
Dudley appeared at trial and defended her case on the merits.
With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, Dudley never
challenged the validity of her indictments. The indictments are
valid in that they sufficiently state the elements of the charged
offenses. Thus, South Carolinawas vested with subject matter
jurisdiction to the extentprovided by a valid indictment.6"

Although the majority found personal jurisdiction and subject matter

jurisdiction satisfied, the court determined that the facts of this case required "an
additionallevel ofjurisdictional analysis.",6 ' Accordingly, the majority addressed
the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction as viewed both by South Carolina and by
other states.62 Ultimately, the court referred to decisions from otherjurisdictions and
secondary authorities in determining an issue of first impression in South Carolina;
namely, whether extraterritorial jurisdiction is a component of subject matter
jurisdiction that the court can raise sua sponte.6' Based on this review, the majority
concluded that "Dudley's jurisdictional challenge is properly viewed as one of
subject matter jurisdiction and more specifically, as one of extraterritorial
jurisdiction."' Ultimately, the majority found no evidence to support the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction over Dudley, 65 and therefore, the court vacated both

of Dudley's convictions.66

b. DissentingOpinion
Judge Anderson wrote a dissenting opinion in which Judge Goolsby joined.67
The dissenters voted to affirm the conviction for trafficking in cocaine and found
60. Dudley, 354 S.C. at 523, 581 S.E.2d at 176 (emphasis added); see also Douglas,245 S.C.
at 87, 138 S.E.2d at 847 ("Generally, jurisdiction of the subject matter is satisfied when appropriate
charges are filed in a competent court, while jurisdiction of the person is acquired when the party
charged is arrested or voluntarily appears in court and submits himself to its jurisdiction.") (citing State
v. Landford, 223 S.C. 20, 27, 23 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1953)).
61. See Dudley, 354 S.C. at 524, 581 S.E.2d at 176 (emphasis added) (noting that Article I,
Section II ofthe South Carolina Constitution grants South Carolina jurisdiction over crimes that occur
within its borders, but questions whether South Carolina may exercise jurisdiction in the present case,
where the "alleged criminal conduct occurred... entirely in Georgia").
62. Id. at 524-29, 581 S.E.2d at 176-79; see infra Part I.C.
63. Dudley, 354 S.C. at 529, 581 S.E.2d at 179; see also supra notes 7, 15 and accompanying
text (discussing that whether extraterritorial jurisdiction is part of subject matter jurisdiction was an
issue of first impression in South Carolina).
64. Dudley, 354 S.C. at 531, 581 S.E.2d at 180.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 537, 581 S.E.2d at 183. Because the majority found no evidence that Dudley intended
her acts to create a detrimental effect in South Carolina, the court concluded that South Carolina could
not exercise jurisdiction over her for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine or for trafficking in cocaine. Id.
at 531,581 S.E.2d at 181.
67. Dudley, 354 S.C. at 538, 581 S.E.2d at 184 (Anderson and Goolsby, JJ., dissenting).
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that the majority's holding "misconstrue[d] and misapplie[d] the law extant in
regard to: (1) personal jurisdiction; (2) subject matter jurisdiction; and (3)
extraterritorial jurisdiction."6"
In analyzing the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the dissenting opinion
noted the general rule that "a state may not prosecute an individual for a crime
69
committed outside its boundaries." While noting this general rule, the dissent also
noted that a state is not prevented from exercising jurisdiction over every case in
which the criminal defendant was not present within the state at the time the crime
occurred.7" "The exception to the rule against extraterritorial jurisdiction requires
a finding that the defendant intended a detrimental effect to occur in this state."'"
The dissent found that "Dudley demonstrated specific intent to act and the intent
supported South
that the harm occur in South Carolina;" therefore, the dissent
7
jurisdiction.
criminal
extraterritorial
of
Carolina's exercise
c.

Concurringand Dissenting Opinion

Judge Stilwell wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part." He found that "[t]he fundamental issue is whether the defense that the State
exceeded its territorial jurisdiction should have been raised to and ruled on by the
trial court."'71 Judge Stilwell further noted that because the issue was not raised to
or ruled on by the trial court, the court of appeals could address the issue only if it
equated extraterritorial jurisdiction to subject matter jurisdiction."
This was an issue of first impression in South Carolina; however, a "review of
the sparse case law from [South Carolina] and the leading cases from other states"
convinced Judge Stilwell that the issue was not a question of subject matter
jurisdiction.76 He noted that no error preservation issues existed in78the two leading
77
South Carolina cases (namely State v. Morrow and State v. Fame ) or in the cases
from other jurisdictions cited by the majority opinion, including both In re

68. Id.
69. Id. at 543, 581 S.E.2d at 186 (citing In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1999); see infra
notes 104-15, 122-25 and accompanying text.
70. Dudley, 354 S.C. at 543, 581 S.E.2d at 186-87 (citing Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d at 610).
71. Id. at 545, 581 S.E.2d at 188 (citing Blume, 505 N.W.2d at 846) (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 547, 581 S.E.2d at 188. Contra text accompanying note 66 (discussing the majority
opinion).
73. Dudley, 354 S.C. at 547, 581 S.E.2d at 188 (Stilwell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Stilwell's analysis is of particular significance to this Note because he overtly stated that
he was "not convinced that extraterritorial jurisdiction is equivalent to subject matter jurisdiction." Id.
at 547, 581 S.E.2d at 189.
74. Id.at 547, 581 S.E.2d at 189.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 40 S.C. 221, 18 S.E. 853 (1893).
78. 190 S.C. 75, 1 S.E.2d 912 (1939).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2004

9

South Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. LAW
55, Iss.
3 [2004], Art. 11 [Vol. 55: 543
SOUTH
CAROLINA
REVIEW

Vasquez79 and People v. Blume,8 ° "because objections to the court's jurisdiction
were appropriately made in the trial court, fully argued, and ruled on."'" Judge
Stilwell concluded with the following:
Subject matterjurisdiction is generally determined as a matter
of law, requiring little if any evidence, particularly evidence of the
intent of the accused. I frankly do not know whether
extraterritorial jurisdiction is a part of personal jurisdiction, or is
a third kind ofjurisdiction not yet clearly articulated as such by
the courts of South Carolina. I am nevertheless convinced it is an
issue that must be raised to and ruled on by the trial court, as well
as properly briefed to this court to warrant our addressing it.
Because Dudley did neither, I would affirm her conviction.82
III. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

3

GENERALLY AND BOTH SOUTH CAROLINA'S AND
OTHER STATES' TREATMENT OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

"O[ne] of the most difficult words in the legal lexicon to delineate is the term
'jurisdiction."'8 4 Derived from the Latin word "jurisdictio," meaning the
"administration of the law," jurisdiction refers to "administration of justice;
authority or legal power to hear and decide cases.,,85 Black's Law Dictionary

defines jurisdiction as:

79. 705 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1999).
80. 505 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1993).
81. State v. Dudley, 354 S.C. 514,548,581 S.E.2d 171, 189 (Stilwell, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part), petitionfor cert., Adv. Sh. No. 31 (Aug. 18, 2003) (No. 364 1).
82. Id. at 549, 581 S.E.2d at 189-90. But see infra Part IV (arguing that although South Carolina
should not treat territorial jurisdiction as a component of subject matter jurisdiction, a defect in
territorial jurisdiction resembles a defect in subject matter jurisdiction in that both jurisdictional
elements are fundamental limitations on the court's authority. Therefore, a defect in territorial
jurisdiction should be able to be raised by a party for the first time on appeal or sua sponte by an
appellate court).
83. "T[here] are four different theories of criminal jurisdiction, namely: (1) territorial, (2)
Roman, (3) injured forum, and (4) cosmopolitan." Rollin M. Perkins, The TerritorialPrinciple in
CriminalLaw, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1155, 1155 (1970-71) (footnote omitted). "Some courts have listed
five . . . [theories], designated 'territorial,' 'nationality,' 'protective,' 'universality,' and 'passive
personality."' Id. at n.l. "[T]he common law recognized only the territorial theory of criminal
jurisdiction." Id. at 1156. Even today, "[t]he authority of legislatures and courts in criminal matters is
supposed to be circumscribed by the territorial boundaries of the state." Wendell Berge, Criminal
Jurisdictionand the TerritorialPrinciple,30 MICH. L. REv. 238, 238 (1931-32). Berge discusses the
reality of modern crime conditions and postulates that a solution to the criminal jurisdiction problem
"can be effectuated only by a frank acceptance of elastic jurisdictional principles which
are adaptable
to the realities of modern crime situations." Id. at 239, 244.
84. B. J.George, Jr., ExtraterritorialApplication of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REv. 609,
609 (1966).
85. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 734 (3d ed. 1997).
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1. A government's general power to exercise authority over all
persons and things within its territory. 2. A court's power to
decide a case or issue a decree. 3. A geographic area within which
political or judicial authority may be exercised. 4. A political or
6
judicial subdivision within such an area.
Courts generally consider two types of jurisdiction: subject matter jurisdiction
and personal jurisdiction.87 However, at least one state, Virginia, has found the
following:
The term jurisdiction embraces several concepts including
subject matterjurisdiction,which is the authority granted through
constitution or statute to adjudicate a class of cases or
controversies; territorialjurisdiction, that is, authority over
persons, things, or occurrences located in a defined geographic
area; notice jurisdiction, or effective notice to a party or if the
""
proceeding is in rem seizure of a res. ...
In addition, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has noted "that before a court may
exercise judicial power to hear and determine a criminal prosecution, that court
must possess threetypes ofjurisdiction: jurisdiction over the defendant,jurisdiction
'
89
over the alleged crime, and territorial jurisdiction." Both Virginia and Tennessee
define the elements of "jurisdiction" to include subject matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, and extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Courts long have misused and mishandled the term "jurisdiction" by finding

86. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 383 (2d pocket ed. 2001).

87. E.g., Dudley, 354 S.C. at 522,581 S.E.2d at 175 ("Jurisdiction is of two distinct kinds...."

(quoting State v. Douglas, 245 S.C. 83, 87, 138 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1964))); see supra note 57 and

accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Wyoming also has treated jurisdiction as of two distinct
kinds, subject matter and personal, thus ultimately subjugating the concept of territorialj urisdiction into
the former kind. See Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242, 245 (Wyo. 1987) ("Subject matter jurisdiction is
limited by the territorial reach of the courts.").
88. Morrison v. Bestler, 387 S.E.2d 753, 755 (Va. 1990) (emphasis added) (citing Farant Inv.
Corp. v. Francis, 122 S.E. 141, 144 (Va. 1924)); see also Gordon v. Commonwealth, 568 S.E.2d 452,

453-54, n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Morrison and recognizing that "there is a significant
difference between subject matter jurisdiction and the other 'jurisdictional' elements"). In

Commonwealth v. Fafone, 621 N.E.2d 1178, (Mass. 1993), the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that Massachusetts could not convict the defendant of three counts of being an

accessory before the fact to trafficking in cocaine because the court lacked territorialjurisdictionover
the crime. Id. at 1178-79. The court made no reference to subject matter jurisdiction or personal
jurisdiction, but stated, "[w]e do not reach the other issues because of the failure of proof of territorial
jurisdiction." Id. at 1179. Therefore, the court in Massachusetts implicitly recognized a difference

between territorial jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.
89. State v. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111, 114 (Tenn. 1999) (emphasis added).
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"subject matter jurisdiction" synonymous with "competency"90 and equating
questions of venue to issues of subject matter jurisdiction. 9' Because a court must
maintain "jurisdiction" over a controversy before it can adjudicate the controversy,
logic requires that "jurisdiction" be broken into all of its constituent parts, including
subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and territorial jurisdiction.
A.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Subject matter jurisdiction is "jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the
type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons
or the status of things."9 South Carolina has defined subject matter jurisdiction as
the power of a court to adjudicate cases belonging to a general class. 93 Subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, even by consent of the party. 94 In light of this
fundamental difference between subject matter jurisdiction and other
"jurisdictional" elements, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments notes:
There is a strong tendency in procedural law to treat various kinds
of serious procedural errors as defects in subject matter
jurisdiction. This is because characterizing a court's departure in

exercising authority as "jurisdictional" permits an objection to the
departure to be taken belatedly. This, in turn, permits a serious
blunder to be remedied despite tardy objection. Thus, if the defect
in the proceeding is treated as a matter of the court's subject

90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § II cmt. a, b (1982) (noting that usage of the
term "subject matterjurisdiction" can result in confusion with territorial jurisdiction, "owing to the fact
that the term 'subject matter jurisdiction' is also commonly used as the synonym of the term
'competence,"' and suggesting that "[t]he confusion can be partly dispelled by recognizing the
differences in the source and functions of the rules governing a state's territorial jurisdiction over a res
and the rules of subject matter jurisdiction").
91. See Gordon, 568 S.E.2d at 453. In Gordon, the defendant filed a motion to set aside his conviction for transporting marijuana into Virginia for a lack of jurisdiction. The trial court found that
Gordon's argument related to venue rather than to subject matter jurisdiction, and that Gordon had
waived the argument by his failure to raise it before trial. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment; however, the court of appeals found that Gordon's claim related to territorial jurisdiction,
not to venue. The court upheld the conviction because Gordon's objection to territorial jurisdiction was
untimely. Id. Gordon is thus an example of a court treating territorial jurisdiction as waivable; thus, the
court noted, "a defendant's claim that the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction is generally waivable.
However, where the defendant claims that the evidence failed to prove that the offense occurred in the
Commonwealth, we have found the claim is not subject to waiver." Id. at 454 (citing Morrison, 387
S.E.2d at 756).
92. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 385 (2d pocket ed. 2001).

93. Pierce v. State, 338 S.C. 139, 150, 526 S.E.2d 222, 227 (2000) (citing Dove v. Gold Kist,
Inc., 314 S.C. 235,442 S.E.2d 598 (1994)); see also supranote 58 and accompanying text (discussing
the definition of subject matter jurisdiction in South Carolina).
94. State v. Douglas, 245 S.C. 83, 87, 138 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1964); see also supra note 57 and
accompanying text (noting that subject matter jurisdiction is nonwaivable).
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matter jurisdiction, then under various circumstances it can be a
basis for arresting the proceedings. . . for complaint on appeal
even though the matter was not raised in the trial court...."
In a criminal case, an indictment is sufficient to confer jurisdiction "if the
offense is stated with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the court to
know what judgment to pronounce, and the defendant to know what he is called
upon to answer and whether he may plead an acquittal or conviction thereon."96
B. PersonalJurisdiction
Personal (or in personam)jurisdiction is "[a] court's power to bring a person
'
In contrast to subject matter jurisdiction, "a party
into its adjudicative process."97
may confer jurisdiction over his person by consent, or may waive the right to raise
the question."98 A party often waives the right to challenge personal jurisdiction by
appearing before the court and defending one's case, as Dudley did.99
In deciding In re Vasquez,"° the Supreme Court of Massachusetts considered
the nature of personal jurisdiction in a criminal setting."°' Vasquez, a Massachusetts
resident, divorced in 1985 and was ordered to make child support payments for his
two children. 0 2 In 1987, Vasquez's ex-wife moved to Oregon with the children and
without Vasquez's knowledge. 3 Vasquez never went to Oregon, and because he
failed to make support payments, his ex-wife "brought a reciprocal support petition
in Oregon in 1988 under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support Act.""' 4
Officials in Oregon obtained an indictment against Vasquez because authorities in

95. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. e (1982) (internal reference omitted). Note
that although the Restatement covers the concepts of subject matter jurisdiction and the other
"jurisdictional" elements in the civil context only, a strong analogy exists between the civil context and
the criminal context, as is discussed below. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
96. State v. Dudley, 354 S.C. 514,522-23,581 S.E.2d 171,175-76 (Ct. App. 2003),pelitionfor
cert.filed,Adv. Sh.No. 31 (Aug. 18,2003) (No. 3641) (citations omitted); see also supranotes 60-61

and accompanying text (discussing when a South Carolina court is vested with subject matter
jurisdiction in criminal cases).
97. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
98. Douglas, 245 S.C. at 87, 138 S.E.2d at 847 (citing City of Florence v. Berry, 61 S.C. 237,
240, 39 S.E. 389, 390 (1901)).

99. See, e.g., Dudley, 354 S.C. at 523, 581 S.E.2d at 176 ("South Carolina was vested with
personal jurisdiction because Dudley appeared at trial and defended her case on the merits.").
100. 705 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1999).
concurring in part
101. Id. at 610-12; Dudley, 354 S.C. at 548, 581 S.E.2d at 189 (Stilwell, J.,

and dissenting in part). Judge Stilwell noted that the majority relied on Vasquez for the proposition that
the issue was not a question of personal jurisdiction. He wrote, "I do not agree, however, with the

inference drawn therefrom that because it is not personal jurisdiction, it must be subject matter
jurisdiction." Id.
102. Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d at 607.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Massachusetts could not locate him. °5 Vasquez was arrested pursuant to a warrant
that Oregon requested from the Governor of Massachusetts." "Vasquez filed a
petition for a writ of habeus corpus," claiming "the courts of Oregon [did] not have
personaljurisdictionover him.'0 7
The court stated that "[t]hejurisprudence of personal jurisdiction has no bearing
on the question whether a person may be brought to a State and tried there for
crimes under that State's laws." ' Furthermore, the court noted that "[t]he
petitioner's claim is more properly viewed as an argument that Oregon has no
legislative jurisdiction to criminalize acts that occur outside the boundaries of the
State."'0 9 The extent of Oregon's extraterritorial jurisdiction thus determined the
question of "[w]hether Oregon may prosecute [Vasquez] for criminal nonsupport.""' The court concluded that the lower court properly denied Vasquez's
petition because Oregon provided for jurisdiction on the theory that "a crime
involving a failure to act is committed at the place where the act is required to be
performed.""'
12
C. ExtraterritorialJurisdiction"

Extraterritorial jurisdiction, also referred to as "territorial jurisdiction," is "[a]
court's ability to exercise power beyond its territorial limits.""' 3 The common law
recognized the territorial theory of criminal jurisdiction, 1 4 and the general rule "is
that a State may not prosecute an individual for a crime committed outside its
boundaries.""'

105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606, 609 (Mass. 1999).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 610.
111. Id. at 611-12 (quoting State v. Gantt, 548 N.W.2d 134, 136 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996)).
112. For a thorough discussion of the history of the territorial principle in criminal law, see
Perkins, supra note 83. See also 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 155 (2003):
No state or sovereignty can enforce the penal laws of another, or punish offenses
committed entirely in and against another; but a state may punish an offense only
part of which has been committed within its limits, or which, although committed
without the state, affects persons or property within it.
See also George, supra note 84 (discussing the ways in which states exercise jurisdiction to penalize
criminal conduct occurring outside the state); Daniel L. Rotenberg, ExtraterritorialLegislative
Jurisdictionand the State CriminalLaw, 38 TEX. L. REV. 763 (1960) (same).
113. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (2d Pocketed. 2001).
114. Perkins, supranote 83, at 1156.
115. Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d at 610; see also People v. Blume, 505 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Mich. 1993)
(noting the "general rule is that jurisdiction is proper only over 'offenses as may be committed within
its [state's physical borders]"' (quoting People v. Devine, 151 N.W. 646 (1915))); State v. Legg, 9
S.W.3d 111, 114 (Tenn. 1999) (noting that territorial jurisdiction is a concept recognizing a state's
power "to punish criminal conduct occurring within its borders"); Moreno v. Baskerville, 452 S.E.2d
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The ability of a state "to exercise jurisdiction over acts that occur outside the
state's physical borders developed as an exception to the [general] rule against
to have,
extraterritorial jurisdiction."' 6 This exception is limited to acts ' "intended
7
and that actually do have, a detrimental effect within the state." "
For example, in People v. Blume," 8 the Supreme Court of Michigan held that
"Michigan may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts committed outside
Michigan when the acts are intended to and do have a detrimentaleffect within the
state."" 9 The court dismissed certain drug-related charges against the defendant, a
resident of Florida, because "knowledge alone is not enough to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction.""'2 "The entire transaction took place in Florida," and
although the defendant knew that the person to whom he sold cocaine was from
Michigan,' 2 ' the court dismissed the charges because there was not sufficient
evidence of intent to cause a detrimental effect in Michigan to warrant exercising
'
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 22
In addition, some states have penalized conduct that took place beyond the
state's boundaries by implying the defendant's "constructive presence" within the
state.' 23 In Simpson v. State, 2 " for example, the Supreme Court ofGeorgia affirmed
the conviction of a man who had been standing in South Carolina when he shot a

man in Georgia.'25 The court stated:

Ofcourse, the presence of the accused within this state is essential
to make his act one which is done in this state, but the presence
need not be actual. It may be constructive ....So, if a man in the

653, 655 (Va. 1995) (recognizing the exception to the general rule against extraterritorial jurisdiction
"where an accused sets in motion a force that operates in another state, such as, for example, the case
of a shot being fired at a person across a state line"); Rios v. State 733 P.2d 242, 245 (Wyo. 1987)
(referring to the common law principle that a state's criminal law has no effect beyond the state's
territorial boundaries). Further, "[tlhe source of this rule [against extraterritorial jurisdiction] is
unsettled and has not been ascribed to any particular constitutional provision." Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d
at 610 (citing State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't. v. W., 578 P.2d 824, 827 n.5 (Or. Ct. App. 1978)).
116. Blume, 505 N.W.2d at 845 (citation omitted); see also Rotenberg, supranote 112, at 764-65
(noting that the reality of contemporary American society, including "boundary straddling" by areas
of large population, increased mobility, and the existence of intelligent and well-organized criminals,
determines the practical importance of the "legal problem of the extraterritoriality of state criminal
law").
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Blume, 505 N.W.2d at 845 (citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280,285 (1911)).
Id. at 843.
Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 844-45.

123. Berge, supra note 83, at 243 (noting that some cases "imply that such presence [of the
offender] is necessary by holding that the offender was constructively present at the place where the
offense was consummated and by proceeding to base jurisdiction on such constructive presence").
124. 17 S.E. 984 (Ga. 1893).

125. Id.
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state of South Carolina criminally fires a ball into the state of
Georgia, the law regards him as accompanying the ball, and as
being represented by it, up to the point where it strikes .... [T]he
act of the accused did take effect in this state. He started across
the river with his leaden messenger, and was operating it up to the
moment when it ceased to move, and was, therefore, in a legal
sense, after the ball crossed the state line, up to the moment that
it stopped, in Georgia."6
Dissenting in Hyde v. UnitedStates,' 27 Justice Holmes referred to "constructive
'
presence" as the "language of fiction."128
Specifically, Justice Holmes stated,
"[w]hen a man is said to be constructively present where the consequences of an act
done elsewhere are felt, it is meant that for some special purpose he will be treated
29
as he would have been treated if he had been present, although he was not."'
In 1893, South Carolina initially addressed the issue of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in State v. Morrow, 31 where the Supreme Court of South Carolina
implicitly recognized and applied the "effects doctrine."' 3 ' Eighteen years after
Morrow, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue in Strassheim v.
Daily,"'32 and in 1939 (post-Strassheim)South Carolina again addressed the issue
"
of extraterritorial jurisdiction in State v. Fame,33
' applying the Strassheim
34
Doctrine.
1.

State v. Morrow

South Carolina addressed the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction in 1893 in
State v. Morrow.3 ' In Morrow, South Carolina indicted defendant Morrow for
abortion and for intent to procure abortion.S6 The indictment charged Morrow with
"having procured and advised the taking of a certain drug with the intent to produce
abortion, and that in consequence of such abortion the death of the woman was
produced.""' Morrow apparently acquired medication in Washington, D.C. and

126. Id. at 985-86, quoted in Blume, 505 N.W.2d at 855 n.12 (Boyle, J., dissenting); Berge,
supra note 83, at 243-44.
127. 225 U.S. 347 (1912).

128. Id. at 386 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting) quoted in Blume, 505 N.W.2d at 855 n. 12 (Boyle, J., dissenting); Berge, supra note 83, at 244).
130. 40 S.C. 221, 18 S.E. 853 (1893).
131. Id. at 242, 18 S.E. at 861; see also infra Part III.C. 1 (discussing Morrow).
132. 221 U.S. 280 (1911); see also infra Part III.C.2 (discussing Strassheim).
133. 190 S.C. 75, 1 S.E.2d 912 (1939).
134. Id. at 83; see also infra Part HI.C.3 (discussing Fame).
135. Morrow, 40 S.C. at 221, 18 S.E. at 853.
136. Id. at 229-30, 18 S.E. at 856.
137. Id. at 222, 18 S.E. at 853.
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mailed it to a woman 38in South Carolina, who took the medication, had an abortion,
and died as a result.1
The court, in deciding whether South Carolina had jurisdiction, implicitly
recognized the 'effects doctrine,'1 39 which instructs "that a person may commit an
offence within this State by putting in motion a force which takes effect here...' 40
in this State.'
although the party charged may never have been personally present
The court concluded that although Morrow was in Washington when he used "an
innocent agent, the United States mail,"'' to send drugs to the woman in South
Carolina, he had the intent to cause an abortion and the woman actually ingested the
offense was, in the eye of the law, committed
drugs in South Carolina; thus, "the
42
within the limits of this state."
2. Strassheim Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the concept of strict territorial
43
jurisdiction in 1911 in Strassheim v. Daily. In Strassheim, the State of Michigan
sought to extradite Daily, a man from Illinois, to answer charges of bribery and
"obtaining money from the State by false pretenses." The charges related to
machinery that Daily had sold to the State of Michigan.'" The Governor of Illinois
45
granted Michigan's request for a warrant extraditing Daily to Michigan.' Daily
then filed a petition for habeus corpus,"4 and at the hearing, presented evidence that
47
he was in Chicago when the alleged bribery and false pretenses were made. The
district court granted the habeus corpus petition, finding that the events alleged "did
148
not constitute a crime against the laws of Michigan."' The United States Supreme

138. Id. at 237, 18 S.E. at 860. There was some evidence that the defendant had sexual intercourse with the girl resulting in pregnancy and that when she told the defendant about her condition,
"he then formed the intention of using means to cause an abortion." Id. at 235-36, 18 S.E. at 858.
139. State v. Dudley, 354 S.C. 514, 527, 581 S.E.2d 171, 178 (Ct. App. 2003),petitionfor cert.
filed, Adv. Sh. No. 31 (Aug. 18, 2003) (No. 3641) (citing Morrow, 40 S.C. at 236-38, 18 S.E. at
858-59). See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "effects doctrine."
140. Morrow, 40 S.C. at 242, 18 S.E. at 861.
141. Id. at 237, 18 S.E. at 860.
142. Id. at 240, 18 S.E. at 860.
143. 221 U.S. 280 (1911); see United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 1980) (connecting the development of the objective territorial theory to Justice Holmes in Strassheim); In re
Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606, 610-11 (Mass. 1999) (tracing the "effects doctrine" to Strassheim);People
v. Blume, 505 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Mich. 1993) (citing Strassheim "as an exception to the rule against
extraterritorial jurisdiction"); Dudley, 354 S.C. at 525, 581 S.E.2d at 177 (citing Strassheim as the
United States Supreme Court's expansion of the strict territorial theory); Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242,
245-46 (Wyo. 1987) (discussing Strassheim as "extending the reach of the territorial jurisdiction
concept"); Rotenberg, supra note 112, at 780-81 (quoting Justice Holmes from Strassheim).
144. Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 281-82.
145. Id. at281.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 283.
148. Id. at 281.
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Court reversed the district court's order granting the writ and held that Michigan
could prosecute Daily.'49 In an opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court stated:
If a jury should believe the evidence and find that Daily did the
acts that led Armstrong to betray his trust, deceived the Board of
Control, and induced by fraud the payment by the State, the usage
of the civilized world would warrant Michigan in punishing him,
although he never had set foot in the State until after the fraud was
complete. Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to
produceandproducingdetrimentaleffects within itjusti a State
in punishingthe cause ofthe harm as ifhe had been presentat the
effect, ifthe State should succeed in getting him within its
50
power.1
The Court assumed, for purposes of habeus corpus, that Daily was a criminal
under the laws of Michigan, and although it did not necessarily follow that he was
a "fugitive from justice" within the provisions of the United States Constitution,'
Justice Holmes noted that a criminal does not have to do "every act necessary to
complete the crime" within the state.' 52 Rather, "[i]f he does there an overt act
which is and is intended to be a material step toward accomplishing the crime" and
then leaves the state completing the crime elsewhere, "he becomes afugitivefrom
' 53
justice, when the crime is complete, if not before."'
3.

State v. Fame

In 1939, South Carolina addressed the Strassheimdoctrine in State v. Fame. S
In this case, Fame faced charges of circulating an alleged forged bank check, and
the co-defendant, Kennedy, faced charges of being an accessory before the fact.'55
Kennedy moved to quash the indictment, alleging that as to him, it was contrary to
law because the offense was committed both inside and outside the state. 5 6 The
indictment alleged that Kennedy's felonious acts occurred both inside South
Carolina and in places outside the state, including Asheville, North Carolina and

149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 285.
Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 284-85. (emphasis added).
Id. at 285 (citing Hyatt v. Cockran, 188 U.S. 691, 712 (1903)) (emphasis added).
Id.

153. Id. (emphasis added). Note that other states have recognized the Strassheim Doctrine as
providing an exception to the general rule against extraterritorial jurisdiction-an exception limited to
those acts intending to produce, and actually producing, a detrimental effect within the state. Some
states refer to this as the "effects doctrine." See, e.g., In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606, 610-11 (Mass.
1999) (discussing the "effect doctrine"); supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
154. 190 S.C. 75, 1 S.E.2d 912 (1939).

155. Id. at 76, 1 S.E.2d at 912.
156. Id. at 82, 1 S.E.2d at 915.
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Nashville, Tennessee.' 57 Kennedy argued that if a person is an accessory before the
fact, he "should be tried in the State where he instigates the crime," not in the state
where the principal commits the crime.' 58 However, the court upheld Kennedy's
conviction, under the follow rationale:
Although the general rule is that a State or sovereignty cannot
punish for offenses committed beyond its territorial limits, it may
pass laws in regard to its own citizens which will be binding and
obligatory on them when they are beyond such limits, and for the
violation of which they may be punished in its Courts, whenever
it can find them within its jurisdictions. Aside from this, where a
person, being beyond the limits of a State or Country, puts in
operation a force which produces a result and constitutes a crime
within those limits, he is as liable to indictment and punishment,
if jurisdiction can be obtained of his person, as if he had been
within the limits of the State or Country when the crime was
committed. 5 9

4. JurisdictionalStatutes
Some states have adopted the Strassheim doctrine by enacting specific
legislation clearly defining the state's jurisdictional reach over criminal activity
6
occurring outside the state. 6 For example, in People v. Blume ' the Supreme Court
of Michigan acknowledged that the state of Michigan "has not defined the
boundaries of the exception [to the rule against extraterritorial jurisdiction], but [the
state] consistently has required a finding that the actor intended a detrimental effect
to occur in this state."'62 The dissent "agree[d] with the majority that the Legislature

157. Id.
158. Id. at 83, 1 S.E.2d at 915. In making this argument, Fame and Kennedy relied on Section
17, Article 1 of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895, which provided the following: "No person
shall be held to answer for any crime... unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury of the
county where the crime shall have been committed." Id. at 82-83, 1 S.E.2d at 915.
159. Fame, 190 S.C. at 83, 1 S.E.2d at 915 (quoting 16 C.J.S. § 198).
160. State v. Dudley, 354 S.C. 514, 526, 581 S.E.2d 171, 177 (Ct.App. 2003),petitionfor cert.
filed, Adv. Sh. No. 31, (Aug. 18, 2003) (No. 3641) (listing various state statutes that implement the
Strassheimdoctrine); see also In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606, 611 (Mass. 1999) ("Many States have
enacted jurisdictional statutes specifically permitting prosecution under the rule of Strassheim, and
some courts, in upholding prosecutions of persons who committed criminal acts outside the State, are
careful to cite these statutes as justification."). In Vasquez, Oregon had no such statute, but the court
observed, "it does not necessarily follow that the Oregon courts are disabled from relying on the rule
of Strassheim." Id; see also infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text (discussing that states should
still be able to rely on the Strassheim doctrine without explicit legislation, and therefore, reach criminal
behavior occurring outside a state).
161. 505 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1993).
162. Id. at 846 (citing Deur v. Newaygo Sheriff, 362 N.W.2d 698 (Mich. 1984)).
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may proscribe conduct that occurs outside our physical borders that is intended to
produce, and actually produces, a detrimental effect in Michigan."' 63 Furthermore,

the dissent noted that:
The statute may only be enforced against conduct that occurs out
of state if the Legislature's intent to give the statute extraterritorial
effect is clear. The statutes in question are silent with regard to
their extraterritorial application. We therefore look to their
purpose and subject matter to determine the relevant legislative
intent.'"
Likewise, in State v. Legg165 the Supreme Court of Tennessee addressed
"whether the State of Tennessee has territorial jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee
Code Annotated section 39-11-103(b)(1) to prosecute a charge of aggravated
kidnapping that was commenced in Alabama.' ' 166 In 1858, Tennessee modified the
common law rule against extraterritoriality by enacting a statute that conferred
jurisdiction on the courts over certain crimes commenced outside of the state but
consummated within the state. 67 The court held that the statute allows the state to
"exercise territorial jurisdiction over continuing offenses when at least one element
68s
of the crime is continued and therefore committed in Tennessee."'
In State v. Dudley, 69 the South Carolina Court of Appeals observed that
"[a]lthough states with a specific legislative enactment certainly more clearly define
a state's jurisdictional power over criminal conduct outside of its territorial borders,
the absence of a state jurisdictional statute is not dispositive.', 70 Thus, the court
concluded that the absence of a statute does not preclude South Carolina from

163. Id. at 856 (Boyle, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 857 (Boyle,J.,
dissenting).
165. 9 S.W.3d 111 (Tenn. 1999).
166. Id. at 112.
167. Id. at 114 (interpreting TENN. CODE § 4973 (1858)). In 1989, "the legislature reworded the
statute to read, 'When an offense is commenced outside this state and consummated in this state, the
person committing the offense is liable for punishment in this state in the county in which the offense
was consummated, unless otherwise provided by statute." Id. at 115 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39I 1-103(b)(l) (1997)).
168. Id. at 118. The court held "that when an offense is continuing in nature and has continued
into Tennessee from another state, the offense is deemed to have both commenced and consummated
anew in Tennessee so long as any essential element to the offense continues to be present in
Tennessee." Id. at 116. The court also held that the legislature "intended for the crime of aggravated
kidnaping to punish a continuing course of conduct," and because there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to determine that at least one element of the crime occurred in Tennessee, the court reversed the
lower court's judgment that the state lacked territorial jurisdiction. Legg, 9 S.W.3d at 118-19.
169. 354 S.C. 514, 581 S.E.2d 171 (Ct. App. 2003), petition for cert. filed, Adv. Sh. No. 31
(Aug. 18, 2003) (No. 3641).
170. Id. at 526, 581 S.E.2d at 177 (citing Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242, 249 (Wyo. 1987))
(recognizing that a state is not precluded from relying on the Strassheim doctrine in the absence of a
jurisdictional statute); In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606, 611 (Mass. 1999) (same).
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71
exercisingjurisdiction over "out-of-state criminal conduct."' As one commentator
has written,

[a]n examination of selected current criminal statutes reveals
that though there are many directed at extraterritoriality, the states
differ considerably in regard to the total amount of legislation, the
crimes covered, and the methods of drafting and organizing

provisions.... Few of the states checked have a thorough and
orderly method for dealing with criminal jurisdiction. Why this is
so is not known.... Whatever the reasons, the present status17 2of
is not adequate.
state legislation on the extraterritorial crime
5.

ExtraterritorialJurisdictionin Contrast to Venue

"Venue has been defined as the locality where the offense is triable. .

.

The rules of territorial jurisdiction differ from the rules of venue: "[t]he former are
rules determining whether a state may adjudicate a matter at all, while the latter are
74
rules determining which court within the state is the proper forum."' "[T]here is

a conflict of authority as to whether the rules as to venue relate to jurisdiction of the

171. Dudley, 354 S.C. at 526, 581 S.E.2d at 178 at 526, 581 S.E.2d at 178. In a footnote, the
court noted that the General Assembly has "extend[ed] the reach of South Carolina's criminal statutes"
in at least two situations. Id. at n.3 (quoting both statutory sections). The first of these situations is
found in section 17-21-30, entitled "[v]enue where perpetrator of homicide and victim are in different
states:"
When any person within the limits of this State shall inflict an injury on any
person who at the time the injury is inflicted is beyond the limits of this State or
when any person beyond the limits of this State shall inflict an injury on any
person at the time within the limits of this State and such injury shall cause the
death of the person injured, in either case the person causing such death shall be
subject to be indicted, tried and punished in the first case in the county of this
State where the person inflicting the injury was at the time when the injury was
inflicted and, in the second case; in the county in which it was received.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-21-30 (West 2003). The second situation involving this extension is section 1721-50, entitled: "[v]enue for accessories before the fact." This section provides:
A person charged as an accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried and
punished in the same court and county in which the principal felon might be
indicted and tried, although the offense of counseling, hiring or procuring the
commission of such felony is committed on the high seas or on land outside of the
county either within or without the limits of this State.
S.C. Code Ann. § 17-21-50 (West 2003).
172. Rotenberg, supra note 112, at 771.
173. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 177 (2003). This section also defines venue as "the county, or
jurisdiction, or geographical subdivision, or territorial area within the state or district, in which the
prosecution is, or must be, brought or tried." Id.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECONI) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 cmt. h (1982).
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subject matter or merely confer a personal right which the accused may waive."' 75
The two are often distinguished:
While it has been held that venue involves jurisdiction of the
subject matter, so that it is not subject to waiver by accused, it has
also been held that in this context "jurisdiction" refers to
jurisdiction of the particular case rather than jurisdiction of the
subject matter or the person, that venue relates to practice and
procedure and not to jurisdiction, that the right to have the case
tried in a particular county is a right personal to [the] accused
which may be waived by him, and that improper venue will not
76
deprive a court of jurisdiction over a criminal action.
Some state constitutions and statutes reflect the common law principle that
proper venue exists in the county where the offense occurred, "but in the absence
of a constitutional inhibition, the legislature may fix venue otherwise."'7 However,
"[q]uestions of venue in criminal cases raise deep issues of public policy and are not
merely matters of formal legal procedure."'' 7 1 Public policy thus determines how
courts should construe legislation concerning venue.' 7 Generally, "[t]he rules of
territorial jurisdiction are to be distinguished from rules of venue."'
IV.

REVISITING STATE V. DUDLEY AND THE TREATMENT OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION AS A COMPONENT OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The complexity of modem crime and social policy considerations require a
flexible approach to criminal jurisdiction, including certain exceptions to the
general rule against extraterritorial jurisdiction.' South Carolina courts concede
this point. But while the nature of crime requires a certain degree of doctrinal
flexibility, the integrity of the legal system requires a degree of doctrinal clarity.'

175. 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw§ 177 (2003); see, e.g., supra note 91 (discussing venue and territorial jurisdiction issues in Gordon v. Virginia, 568 S.E2d 452 (Va. Ct. App. 2002)).
176. 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 177 (2003) (citations omitted).

177. Id. at § 178.
178. Id. at § 177.
179. Id.
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 cmt. h (1982).
181. See Berge, supra note 83, at 244 ("Reality in modern crime conditions must be faced; the
important question must be not so much one of respecting the theoretical sovereignty of neighboring
states as one of evolving workable principles upon which to base effective administration of criminal
law."); see also People v. Blume, 505 N.W.2d 843, 856 (Mich. 1993) (Boyle, J., dissenting) (noting
that Michigan has "recognized exceptions to the general rule against extraterritorial" jurisdiction as
populations have grown, technology has progressed, and mobility betweenjurisdictions has increased).
182. As should be apparent from this Note, there is a conflict of authority as to the proper
treatment of the various jurisdictional elements, including subject matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, and to some extent, venue. Therefore, the law regarding these
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The question remains: what exactly does the term "jurisdiction" encompass?'
Admittedly, it includes the long-recognized concepts of subject matter jurisdiction
and personal jurisdiction. But does the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction have
any additional significance regarding the scope of jurisdiction?
This Note proposes a solution, albeit a solution contrary to the majority's
holding in State v. Dudley. 8 4 Rather than asking whether extraterritorial jurisdiction
is either a component of subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, the
courts should consider a third alternative; namely, the one tacitly proposed by Judge
Stilwell in his concurrence and dissent: "whether extraterritorial jurisdiction.., is
a third kind ofjurisdiction not yet clearly articulated as such by the courts of South
Carolina."' 85
Whatever the correct approach, a review of other states' case law and secondary
sources leads to the conclusion that for purposes of balancing the competing goals
of flexibility and clarity, courts should treat extraterritorial jurisdiction as an entirely
separate jurisdictional element and not necessarily a component of either subject
86
matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction.
In viewing extraterritorial jurisdiction as a separate requirement, courts must
consider whether a defect in extraterritorialjurisdiction is as fundamental as a defect
in subject matter jurisdiction and thus capable of being raised by a party for the first
time on appeal or sua sponte by an appellate court, or whether a defect in
extraterritorial jurisdiction is more like a defect in otherjurisdictional elements that
a party can waive. "With respect to objections to the jurisdiction of the court in
criminal prosecutions, a distinction is to be made between those which involve
jurisdiction or fundamental rights of accused and those which involve mere
87
personal privileges of accused; the former cannot be waived, but the latter can."'
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments contrasts the concepts of subject
matter jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction in the civil context and somewhat
cryptically states that issues of subject matterjurisdiction are "matters of the organic
law of the government involved, state or federal," while the rules of territorial
jurisdiction stem from "the rules that define the political authority of the state
itself."'88 The Restatement thus draws a distinction between the source of subject
matter jurisdiction and the source of territorial jurisdiction: the rules of subject
matter jurisdiction stem from "the political authority that has created the
court"--Congress and the state legislatures-and the rules of territorial jurisdiction

elements often provides blurry distinctions rife with conceptual difficulty. Courts struggle to balance
the competing goals of doctrinal flexibility and doctrinal clarity, and this Note proposes only one
possible solution in an effort to find a proper balance for South Carolina.
183. This question refers only to criminal jurisdiction for purposes of this Note.
184. 354 S.C. 514, 581 S.E.2d 171 (Ct. App. 2003); petitionfor cert.filed, Adv. Sh. No. 31
(Aug. 18, 2003).
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185. Id. at 549, 581 S.E.2d at 189 (Stilwell, J.,
186. See supra Part III.
187. 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 175 (2003) (emphasis added).
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. b (1982).
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are "embodied in the Constitution."' 9
Furthermore, although "a state may refrain from exercising the full range of
territorial jurisdiction that the Constitution permits," regardless of how a state
chooses to define its territorial jurisdiction, it must stay within the prescribed
constitutional limit.' 90 Thus, "[t]he definition of proper territorial jurisdiction of the
states ...
derives from Constitutional limitations upon the authority of the states and
from limitations established by the law of the states themselves."' 9'

In the civil context, the decision in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington192
established the concept of "minimum contacts,"' 93 referring to the constitutional
requirement that a defending party must have a certain relationship with the forum
state to make the exercise of territorial jurisdiction reasonable. 94 Interestingly,
because the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth
Amendment governs territorial jurisdiction in the state court system and the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution's Fifth Amendment governs
territorial jurisdiction in the federal court system in both the civil context and the
criminal context, one can draw a clear analogy between the "minimum contacts"
test and the "effects doctrine." The due process analogy does provide some insight
into the nature of territorial jurisdiction; perhaps due process, viewed from the
defendant's perspective, and territorial jurisdiction, viewed from the states'
perspective, are analogous in that they both measure a state's power to reach beyond
its borders. However, due process in the civil context is a broader concept that
includes certain personal privileges that a party can waive, while territorial
jurisdiction (viewed from the states' perspective) is more fundamental and concerns
the state's actual authority to subject persons to its political will. Because a
distinction exists between jurisdictional objections relating to fundamental rights,
which a party cannot waive, and those relating to personal privileges, which a party
can waive, a strong argument exists that territorial jurisdiction is a fundamental right
that a party should not be able to waive.' 95
Essentially, although subject matterjurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction have
different sources and deserve recognition as separate jurisdictional elements, they
both impose fundamental limitations on a court's authority to adjudicate. Policy

189. Id.
190. Id.; see also 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 156 (2003) ("Criminal jurisdiction conferred on a
court by the constitution is subject to legislative change only where, and to the extent, permitted by the
constitution."); Id. § 154 ("Subject to constitutional limitations, the legislature may enlarge or curtail
the criminal jurisdiction of courts ....
").
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 cmt. a (1982); see also id. § 4 cmt. c (noting
that in addition to constitutional limitations, "[t]he scope of a state's territorial jurisdiction may be
limited by provisions of the state's own decisional law, statutes and rules of court.").
192. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
193. Id. at317.
194. See also RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF THELAWOF JUDGMENTS § 4 cmt. a (1982) (discussing
InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 317).
195. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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considerations, including basic notions of fairness and the legal system's
overarching interest in providing valid judgments, support the argument that
territorial jurisdiction is so basic a requirement that South Carolina should treat a
defect as nonwaivable-similar to a defect in subject matterjurisdiction. Therefore,
96
although the court in State v. Dudley erred by treating extraterritorial jurisdiction
97
as a component of subject matter jurisdiction,' the court correctly recognized the
9
fundamental nature of extraterritorial jurisdiction by raising the issue sua sponte. '
Jurisdiction is a comprehensive concept comprised of various elements, including
subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, andterritorial jurisdiction. While
all three elements are commonly "jurisdictional," it does not follow that one element
must fit snugly within, or ultimately beneath, another element. At most, such a
forced configuration not only confounds the issue but also defeats principles of
logic and common sense.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Note suggests that the South Carolina Court of Appeals erred in treating
extraterritorial jurisdiction as a component of subject matter jurisdiction and
recommends that the Supreme Court of South Carolina treat extraterritorial
jurisdiction as distinct from both subject matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction. Separating the three types of jurisdiction would provide greater
doctrinal clarity. Ultimately, South Carolina should recognize "that before a court
may exercise judicial power to hear and determine a criminal prosecution, that court
the defendant,
must possess [all] three types of jurisdiction: jurisdiction over
99
jurisdiction."'
territorial
and
jurisdiction over the alleged crime,
In Dudley,2" the court correctly dismissed the convictions, determining that
20
South Carolina could not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. ' While the court
rightfully raised the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction and dismissed the charges,
the court inaccurately included extraterritorial jurisdiction in the category of subject
matter jurisdiction. Because the court should have treated extraterritorial
jurisdiction as separate from subject matter jurisdiction, the court also should have
considered the nature of extraterritorial jurisdiction to determine whether it more
closely resembles subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction for purposes
of determining the waivability of the defect.
31
196. 354 S.C. 514, 581 S.E.2d 171 (Ct. App. 2003),petitionfor cert.filed, Adv. Sh.No.
(Aug. 18, 2003) (No. 3641).
197. Id. at 531, 581 S.E.2d at 183.
198. Id.
199. State v. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111, 114 (Tenn. 1999); see also Morrison v. Bestler, 387 S.E.2d
753, 755 (Va. 1990) (recognizing that the term "jurisdiction" encompasses several elements and

describing subject matterjurisdiction separately from other jurisdictional elements, including territorial

jurisdiction); Gordon v. Virginia, 568 S.E.2d 452,453-54 n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Morrison).
200. 354 S.C. 514, 581 S.E.2d 171 (Ct. App. 2003).
201. Id. at 531, 581 S.E.2d at 183.
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Although stemming from different sources, both subject matterjurisdiction and
extraterritorial jurisdiction impose fundamental limitations on the court's authority
to adjudicate. Due to the constitutional origin of extraterritorial jurisdiction, a
strong argument exists that extraterritorial jurisdiction involves a fundamental right
of a party. Although South Carolina should view extraterritorial jurisdiction and
subject matterjurisdiction as separate jurisdictional elements, it should treat a defect
in extraterritorial jurisdiction like a defect in subject matter jurisdiction, thus
capable of being raised by a party for the first time on appeal or sua sponte by the
appellate court.
Emily Nanette Swalm
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